Adversarial tests and benchmark.

What the authorization chain refuses, what a decision costs, and the conditions each number was measured under.

Section A

Adversarial results.

Each case below is an attack against the authorization chain. Each one is denied, and each denial is signed and recorded.

Attack caseOutcome (expected: denied)
Replayed tokenDenied
Unknown signing keyDenied
Token outside its time windowDenied
Parameters changed after approvalDenied
Action outside the agent's scopeDenied
Recorder unavailable (fails closed, signed denial)Denied
Tool call with no redeemed tokenDenied

In production, the one MCP tool that executes an action runs only after the gateway has redeemed a single-use, Ed25519-signed authorization token bound to that call's tenant, action, resource and parameters; a call with no token, a replayed token, or a token that is expired, altered or signed by an unknown key is refused.

27 automated tests. Each defence was disabled in turn and its test failed. Internal testing by 11/11 AI on build e3cd555, 19 November 2026.

Section B

Performance.

Measurementp50p95p99n
Decision, one at a time2.253 ms2.874 ms3.225 ms580
Redemption, one at a time2.407 ms2.913 ms3.579 ms320
Decision, 16 in flight7.803 ms10.816 ms13.191 ms4,000

Throughput: 2,013.7 decisions per second.   Correctness: 4,900 of 4,900.

Apple M4, 10 logical CPUs, 16 GB, Node 22, Postgres 18 on the same machine, loopback, no nginx or TLS. A local test-stack run, not production latency.

Section C

The authorization chain.

A request produces a signed decision. The decision issues a single-use token bound to the tenant, the action, the resource and a hash of the parameters. That token is redeemed before execution, and the redemption is recorded. The record can be verified offline, with nothing loaded from us.

Where the chain ends

The last signed link is the redemption record, not the executed effect itself.

Section D

Scope of verification.

Checked by the public verifier

Ed25519 signatures, the component hashes and the evidence root are checked by the public verifier.

Published; local verification requires liboqs

Post-quantum signatures, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, are published. Verifying them on your own machine requires liboqs.

Section E

Keep going.