Adversarial tests and benchmark.
What the authorization chain refuses, what a decision costs, and the conditions each number was measured under.
Section A
Adversarial results.
Each case below is an attack against the authorization chain. Each one is denied, and each denial is signed and recorded.
| Attack case | Outcome (expected: denied) |
|---|---|
| Replayed token | Denied |
| Unknown signing key | Denied |
| Token outside its time window | Denied |
| Parameters changed after approval | Denied |
| Action outside the agent's scope | Denied |
| Recorder unavailable (fails closed, signed denial) | Denied |
| Tool call with no redeemed token | Denied |
In production, the one MCP tool that executes an action runs only after the gateway has redeemed a single-use, Ed25519-signed authorization token bound to that call's tenant, action, resource and parameters; a call with no token, a replayed token, or a token that is expired, altered or signed by an unknown key is refused.
27 automated tests. Each defence was disabled in turn and its test failed. Internal testing by 11/11 AI on build e3cd555, 19 November 2026.
Section B
Performance.
| Measurement | p50 | p95 | p99 | n |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Decision, one at a time | 2.253 ms | 2.874 ms | 3.225 ms | 580 |
| Redemption, one at a time | 2.407 ms | 2.913 ms | 3.579 ms | 320 |
| Decision, 16 in flight | 7.803 ms | 10.816 ms | 13.191 ms | 4,000 |
Throughput: 2,013.7 decisions per second. Correctness: 4,900 of 4,900.
Apple M4, 10 logical CPUs, 16 GB, Node 22, Postgres 18 on the same machine, loopback, no nginx or TLS. A local test-stack run, not production latency.
Section C
The authorization chain.
A request produces a signed decision. The decision issues a single-use token bound to the tenant, the action, the resource and a hash of the parameters. That token is redeemed before execution, and the redemption is recorded. The record can be verified offline, with nothing loaded from us.
The last signed link is the redemption record, not the executed effect itself.
Section D
Scope of verification.
Checked by the public verifier
Ed25519 signatures, the component hashes and the evidence root are checked by the public verifier.
Published; local verification requires liboqs
Post-quantum signatures, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, are published. Verifying them on your own machine requires liboqs.
Section E